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This study used recently available survey data to examine trends in the rate of first union formation in the 
post-Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  For the first 
time, it shows that the rate of first union formation in each republic is much lower than the Soviet-era 
level at the end of the 1980s.  These results have three implications.  First, they complement the 
literature on Central and Eastern Europe by illustrating the scale of post-socialist demographic change in 
very different cultural and demographic context.  Second, post-Soviet Tajikistan and Uzbekistan here 
provide interesting examples of countries experiencing dramatic declines in first union formation in a 
conservative Moslem setting and at the same time as an increase in religiosity and a decrease in female 
higher education enrolment.  Third, more generally, they serve to illustrate profound changes in 
demographic behaviour during dramatic social and economic change. 
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Introduction  
 
The collapse of communism and the associated changes in the countries affected offer 
‘potentially rich material for an examination of the effects of dramatic sociopolitical 
and economic transformations on marital and fertility behaviour’ (Agadjanian 1999, 
p.426).  However, while the changes in union formation after communism in Central 
and Eastern Europe are well documented, there is not a comparable literature on post-
Soviet Central Asia.  Therefore, by using survey data to describe recent trends in 
union formation in Central Asia, this paper contributes to our understanding of human 
response to dramatic social and economic change. 
 
Union formation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, marriage rates declined sharply after the fall of 
communism (Sobotka 2004).  In most countries this was accompanied by an increase 
in the rate of non-marital union formation but, since this did not fully offset the 
decline in marriage, the proportion of adults living in union decreased (Sobotka and 
Toulemon 2008).  Explanations for these changes in family formation have tended to 
stress the importance of post-communist economic crisis, or of ideational and cultural 
change, new opportunities and the ‘Westernisation’ of behaviour, or of both.  Frejka 
(2008, p.160-1) links these two explanations to one underlying root cause: the 
replacement of the state socialist regimes by the economic and political infrastructure 
of contemporary capitalism.  Thus the change of economic systems led to severe 
economic crises in the early 1990s, in turn constraining family formation, while the   2
overhaul of the economic and political infrastructure was also the ‘basis for emerging 
changes in the value systems, norms and attitudes regarding family formation’. 
 
This ‘root cause’ perspective is helpful in a number of respects.  First, it 
allows for a creative tension between economic and cultural explanations which 
accommodates differences among different post-communist countries.  Indeed, 
ideational change is considered more important in explaining demographic changes in 
Central Europe, which experienced a relatively successful transition, with the depth of 
social and economic crisis more important to changes in ex-Soviet European states 
(Macura 2000; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003; Sobotka 2004).  Second, in a similar way, 
it allows for flexibility in assessing the relative importance of economic and cultural 
factors over time — and therefore for the possibility that, for example, cultural factors 
come to dominate as the economic situation improves (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002).  
Third, it also explicitly considers the importance of economic changes which do not 
fit neatly within ‘crisis’ explanations.  In particular, the longer-term transition from 
socialism and central planning to market economy conditions — encompassing, for 
example, more expensive housing, increased private responsibility for child costs, 
reduced job security and competition in the labour market — is seen as fundamental.  
As Frejka (2008) points out, these emerging market conditions represent important 
economic influences on union formation which persist after, and become no longer 
necessarily associated with, the initial post-communist crisis period of massive 
inflation and sharp increase in unemployment.   
 
Union formation in post-Soviet Central Asia 
   3
While there is an established literature on union formation in post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe, there has been relatively little research on changes in post-Soviet 
Central Asia.  Agadjanian (1999) provides insights into ethnic differences in marriage 
behaviour in Kazakhstan.  Agadjanian and Makarova (2003), using retrospective 
survey data from 1996, show that women in Uzbekistan who reached marriageable 
age during the perestroika  period before independence were more likely to have 
married by a given age than those from preceding cohorts — but, for those reaching 
marriageable age during the post-independence era, marriage dropped back to pre-
perestroika levels.  Most recently, Dommaraju and Agadjanian (2008) provide a 
valuable description of trends in marriage in Uzbekistan (up to 2001), Kazakhstan (up 
to 1998) and Kyrgyzstan (up to 1996).  Again, their results point towards an increase 
in the marriage rate during perestroika — particularly in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
— to a peak in the early post-independence years, followed by a subsequent decline.  
They suggest that, at least for Uzbekistan, this decline was not simply a short-term 
response to economic crisis but rather ‘a long-term change in marriage patterns’ 
(p.205).  However, they acknowledge that ‘a clearer assessment of recent marriage 
patterns in Central Asia will have to wait for new data’ (p.210).   
 
This paper builds on Dommaraju and Agadjanian’s (2008) research in three 
main ways.  First, by using more recent survey data and extending the period of 
analysis to the mid-2000s, it provides a clearer assessment of the nature of post-Soviet 
changes in union formation.  Second, by including Tajikistan as well as Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the analysis, it extends the potential for cross-country 
comparison to four of the five Central Asian Republics (survey data for Turkmenistan 
are restricted).  Tajikistan is an interesting case: it had the highest rate of population   4
growth of all the Soviet republics at the time of independence (Anderson and Silver 
1989).  It was also the poorest Soviet republic, with average income in 1988 around 
50% of that in Russia (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992, p.134), experienced the most 
severe economic crisis post-independence — by 1996, Gross Domestic Product was 
just 39% of 1989 levels (TransMONEE 2006), the biggest decline in Central Asia — 
and yet is, with Uzbekistan, the most socially conservative republic in which Islam 
has the strongest tradition.  Tajikistan therefore offers the opportunity to examine the 
effects of particularly acute economic decline on union formation in a conservative 
Moslem setting.  Unlike the other republics, it also experienced a civil war and so 
offers an opportunity to contribute to the literature on the demography of conflict.  
Given these points, this paper places particular emphasis on investigating the nature 
of changes in Tajikistan — while also maintaining a wider regional, and cross-country 
comparative, focus.  Third, the paper explicitly relates the trends in rates of union 
formation to the nature of post-Soviet change in the republics — and, in particular, to 
ideational changes, economic changes associated with the shift to a market economy, 
and periods of economic crisis.  In order to inform research hypotheses, the nature of 
these sets of changes will now be discussed. 
 
Post-Soviet change in Central Asia 
 
Ideational and cultural changes 
 
The post-Soviet period has seen a revival of Islamic practices —including, for 
example, increased observance of Ramadan — as religion becomes a more important 
feature of public and cultural life (Pascall and Manning 2000; Tazmini 2001).       5
Particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where Islam perhaps has the strongest 
tradition, and where in pre-Soviet times female roles were more restrictive (Jones and 
Grupp 1987), attitudes regarding women’s roles have tended to become more 
conservative since the end of the Soviet Union.  Citing these two republics as 
particular examples, Silova and Magno (2004, p.434) speak of a ‘reassertion of a 
more traditional role of caring for the family and rearing children, which undoubtedly 
affects girls’ education opportunities’.   
 
Indeed, in Tajikistan there is evidence of a decrease in educational enrolment 
after age 12, mainly among girls (Baschieri and Falkingham 2008).   Rates in the non-
compulsory upper secondary ages are especially low, with an enrolment rate of 29% 
in 2003 (TransMONEE 2006), half that of the late Soviet period, with a particularly 
low rate for girls.  While rates of enrolment in tertiary education have remained steady 
in the post-Soviet period, with around 12% of those aged 19–24 years enrolled 
(TransMONEE 2006), the sex gap increased — from 58 girls per 100 boys in 1990 to 
just 34 in 1998 (Falkingham 2000) and 35 in 2005 (UNESCO 2007).  In Uzbekistan 
rates of enrolment in higher education decreased from 14% in 1991 to 8% in 2003 
(TransMONEE 2006), while, as in Tajikistan, fewer women pursue higher education 
than men (Silova and Magno 2004; UNESCO 2007).  In contrast, in both Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, there has been a significant expansion of the tertiary sector, with 
enrolment rates more than doubling between 1996 and 2003 (TransMONEE 2006).  
Given that in both countries the sex gap in higher education is in the other direction 
— with an estimated 142 women enrolled for every 100 men in Kazakhstan, and 125 
women per 100 men in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (UNESCO 2007), this represents a 
considerable increase in female higher education.     6
Economic change associated with the development of a market economy 
 
The transition from socialism and central planning to market economy conditions 
included an increase in the responsibility for child costs.  Indeed, while the general 
picture across the post-Soviet context was of reduced state support for families in a 
range of areas — including family allowance, nursery provision, sick child leave and 
parental benefits —  women in Central Asia experienced a particularly dramatic 
collapse of services (Pascall and Manning 2000), including the most significant 
declines in kindergarten enrolment (Silova and Magno 2004).  This was part of a 
more general shift in which families, and women in particular, were faced with an 
increased share in the responsibility for the care, health and education of dependents, 
as state provision declined.  The reduced availability, and increased cost, of housing is 
another feature of the shift to the market economy of potential importance to union 
formation in the post-Soviet context. 
 
The post-communist period has also seen the emergence of new and 
significant patterns of international labour migration (see Rios 2006).  These 
movements should be distinguished from the ethnic repatriation of the non-titular 
population (for example, of Russians from the Central Asian republics to Russia) in 
the years immediately preceding and subsequent to independence.  Much of the labour 
migration is undocumented and so not recorded in official figures.  For the case of 
Tajikistan, Olimova and Bosc (2003) used survey data to estimate that in 26% of 
households at least one household member had worked abroad at some point between 
2000 and 2003.  Since the vast majority of migrants are men of working age who are 
working in Russia (Mughal 2007), this migration may have an important influence on   7
post-Soviet trends in union formation if the effect is to remove eligible bachelors from 
the marriage market.  There have also been significant labour migration movements 
from other Central Asian republics (see, for example, Ergeshbayev 2006; Maksakova 
2006).  A lack of reliable data on the movements themselves precludes easy 
comparisons of the relative importance of labour migration in the different republics.  
However, data on remittances sent by absent labour migrants do suggest that 
Tajikistan has been the most significantly affected.  Mughal (2007, p.xvii) estimates 
that Tajikistan was the second largest recipient of remittances from Russia in 2006, 
only slightly behind Uzbekistan (a country four times the size in terms of population).  
Indeed, according to a recent estimate, remittances made up 46% of GDP in Tajikistan 
in 2008, a higher figure than for any other country in the world (Ratha et al. 2008).    
 
Periods of economic crisis and food scarcity 
 
Following the end of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of subsidies from Moscow,  
the disruption of trading relationships, together with the transition to a free-market 
economy, led to dramatic economic declines in all of the Central Asian republics 
(Green and Bauer 1998; Falkingham 2005; TransMONEE 2006).  Figure 1 illustrates 
the scale of the crisis, both in terms of depth and the length of time at which GDP 
remained below 1989 levels.  While all republics experienced a shrinkage of their 
economy, Tajikistan fared worst, while Uzbekistan experienced a still severe but more 
moderate decline.  The shrinkage of the economy was accompanied by the removal of 
the ‘three pillars’ of the former Soviet system — guaranteed employment, subsidised 
and stable pricing, and social benefits and services (Standing 1996, p.230) —   8
effecting an increase in unemployment, rapid inflation, a decline in real wages and a 
collapse in social welfare provision (De Soto et al. 2001; TransMONEE 2006).   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
One of the key implications of these changes for the Central Asian population 
was a decrease in food security at the household level (Rhoe et al. 2008).  During the 
Soviet period, Central Asia was not self-sufficient in basic agricultural foodstuffs and 
the region became heavily dependent on food imports from the rest of the Soviet 
Union.  The end of the Soviet period meant the breakdown of these trading 
relationships; in addition, a severe shortage of foreign currency limited the Central 
Asian republics’ ability to fund the necessary basic imports.  While food availability 
fell in post-communist Europe, it did not fall below the minimum requirements 
established by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations; in 
contrast, the food availability decline in Central Asia was such that these minimum 
energy levels were compromised (Rokx et al. 2002).  The result was, with the partial 
exception of Kazakhstan, a region ‘unable to feed its peoples’ (Peimani 2006, p.66).   
Accompanying the decline in food availability in Central Asia were changes in 
accessibility.  Food and nutrition programs, that had ensured minimum food 
consumption levels during the Soviet period, were eliminated (Babu and Rhoe 2006) 
and the liberalisation of previously subsidised food prices — particularly of bread, the 
base of the region’s diet —  had a significant impact on affordability.  
 
While all the Central Asian republics suffered from food insecurity in the early 
post-independence years, the severity of the crisis varied.  The Soviet legacy was   9
different.  In terms of grain, the base of the region’s diet, Kazakhstan was a net 
exporter during the Soviet period and, indeed, remains the sixth largest producer in 
the world (Peimani 2006).  At the other end of the extreme, of all the Soviet republics 
Tajikistan was most dependent on subsidies from Moscow during the Soviet era and 
had the highest inter-republic trade deficit (Foroughi 2002), relying on other republics 
for the vast majority of its grain supply.  The differences in food security are  reflected 
in the estimated prevalence of undernourishment in the different countries (FAO 
2008a; Table 1).  In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in contrast to Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the prevalence of undernourishment significantly increased from 1993–
95 to 2001–03, in part reflecting the drought in these countries in 2000–01.  Indeed, as 
FAO (2006) conclude, of the post-communist countries in Europe, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, the most serious declines in food security were in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.  As the data show, Tajikistan was worst affected of all.  
 




There are reasons to expect a significant decrease in first union formation in post-
Soviet Central Asia.  Abbasi et al. (2002) argue that economic hardship was a major 
factor behind the postponement of marriage in Iran between 1986 and 1996.  More 
generally, Caldwell (2004, p.383), reviewing the demographic response to a range of 
social upheavals in different contexts, identifies the postponing or forgoing a marriage 
as a ‘rational response to huge changes in material circumstances’ (ibid., p.398).  This 
may be particularly applicable in the Central Asian context when the ceremony and   10
associated gift exchanges are traditionally very expensive and a focus for conspicuous 
demonstrations of wealth (Tett 1996; Agadjanian and Makarova 2003; Kuehnast and 
Dudwick 2004).  More specifically, one of the key implications for the Central Asian 
population was a decrease in food security at the household level, manifested in 
periods of particular food scarcity.  There is an established literature on the 
demographic implications of food scarcity — and a decrease in the rate of union 
formation is an established response to such a crisis (Lee 1981; Galloway 1988).   
 
In addition, as well as particular periods of economic and food crisis, the 
longer term economic changes associated with the transition to a market economy 
may have encouraged decreases in the rate of first union formation.  Reduced state 
support for families and children, and the more general increase in the burden on the 
family for the care, health and education of dependents, may have raised concerns 
about couples’ ability to support a family.  Given not only the particularly dramatic 
collapse in family services in Central Asia (Pascall and Manning 2000), but also the 
strong cultural expectation of a swift progression from marriage to childbearing 
(Tabyshalieva 1997), an inability to support children may have translated to a decision 
to postpone or forgo marriage.  A further change associated with the transition to a 
market economy and prompted by economic need, international labour migration, 
may also have encouraged a decline in first union formation by reducing the supply of 
eligible men.  
 
On the other hand, it is unclear that there has been a widespread change in 
underlying values or attitudes towards marriage and childbearing in the region.  The 
concomitants of a decline in the rate of first union formation driven by ideational   11
factors — including a decline in the importance of marriage, more egalitarian 
perceptions of gender roles within the family, and an expansion of tertiary education 
— do not apply universally here.  On the contrary, for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan at 
least, there has been a tendency towards more conservative gender attitudes in the 
post-Soviet period, and there is evidence for a decrease in female enrolment in tertiary 
education.  This might be expected to mitigate against significant declines in rates of 
union formation, despite the economic pressures for decline.   
 
These conflicting expectations for the overall change in rates of first union 
formation in the region also translate into conflicting expectations for cross-country 
differences in trends.  On the one hand, Tajikistan was worst affected by the economic 
crisis, showing the biggest declines in GDP and real wages (TransMONEE 2006).  It 
has also been the republic most affected by international labour emigration, and the 
country, followed by Uzbekistan, which faced the most acute declines in food 
security.  These factors might point towards a more significant decline in the rate of 
first union formation than in the other Central Asian republics.  On the other hand, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also the most traditional republics, in which gender 
roles are most conservative and in which Islam has the strongest tradition.  Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan have also seen declines in female tertiary enrolment, compared to the 
increases in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  These factors might point towards a less 
significant decline in first union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan than in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.   
   12
Data and Method 
 
Given these conflicting expectations, interest centred on examining trends in first 
union formation in each of the Central Asian republics since independence.  However, 
official registration data are inadequate for a reliable assessment of temporal trends.  
Dikaev (2005) reports one estimate which suggests that only half of all marriages in 
Tajikistan are now officially registered.  Under-registration is also a problem in other 
Central Asian states (Dommaraju and Agadjanian 2008). 
 
Therefore, because of the inadequacy of official data, survey data were used to 
calculate rates of first union formation in late- and post-Soviet Central Asia.  The 
latest round of Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS3), carried out by UNICEF, 
represent the most recent data available.  They are nationally representative sample 
surveys with a women’s questionnaire, for those aged 15–49 at the time of the survey, 
which included questions on first union formation.  Specifically, women were asked 
the question ‘In what month and year did you first marry or start living with a man as 
if married?’  This is a more accurate reflection of the date of first union than the date 
of marriage registration and, given the significant under-registration issues, a more 
complete one.  Surveys were carried out in Tajikistan (2005), Kyrgyzstan (2005/6), 
Kazakhstan (2006) and Uzbekistan (2006), with 10,626, 7,043, 14,719 and 14,205 
women interviewed respectively.   
 
For each country, rates of first union, specific to those women who have never 
been in union (hereafter, ‘unmarried’ women), were calculated using a simple 
proportional hazards exponential model:   13
 
log log ii     x                            (1) 
 
In this model (Model 1), i   is the hazard corresponding to individual i,    is the 
baseline hazard when i x =0, andexp{ } i  x is the relative risk, a proportionate increase 
or decrease in the rate associated with the covariate characteristics i x .   
 
To ensure comparability across time, rates were calculated based on first 
unions, and exposure to first unions, for women aged 29 or under, for periods where 
the age distribution of women is complete up to age 30.  Since first unions in Central 
Asia are concentrated at a relatively young age — traditionally an unmarried woman 
over the age of 20 is in danger of being considered an ‘old maid’ (Tabyshalieva 1997, 
p.52) — truncation is not a significant problem.   
 
A piecewise exponential model was also specified where the process time t, 
time since 15
th birthday, is split into age intervals j, assuming a constant hazard within 
these intervals: 
 
log log ij j i     x                           (2) 
 
where  j   is the baseline hazard for age interval j (Model 2).  The age intervals chosen 
broadly reflect ‘early’ (15–17), ‘peak’ (18–20) and ‘late’ (21–29) ages at first union. 
Implicitly, under the proportional hazards assumption, the effect of the calendar year 
covariates is assumed to be the same for all age intervals j.  However, the model was 
extended to allow for the relaxation of this assumption.  Specifically, an interaction   14
between the age intervals and calendar year was included in the model to allow for 
differences in trends in first union formation for different age groups of unmarried 
women:  
 
log log ij j i j     x                            (3) 
 
where j   represents the effect of calendar period for age interval j (Model 3). 
 
Model 4 is similar to Model 2 (equation 2) but with an extra covariate, the 
mother tongue of the household head, included as a measure of ethnicity.  This 
controls for any changes in the ethnic composition of the population at risk over time.  
Finally, Model 5 is similar to Model 2 but only a specific subpopulation, the titular 
nationality in each republic, was considered: Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajiks in Tajikistan and Uzbeks in Uzbekistan.  This is helpful when 
assessing whether or not differences in the overall nature of trends across republics 
are simply a reflection of differences in the relative size of ethnic minority 
populations.  There is a more significant minority population in Kazakhstan than 
elsewhere: using the mother tongue of the household head as a measure, 59% of 
women interviewed in Kazakhstan were Kazakhs; corresponding figures for the 
proportion of titular nationalities in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were 62%, 
73% and 84%. 
    15
Results 
 
Trends in overall rate of first union formation 
 
Figure 2 presents trends in first union formation for women in late- and post-Soviet 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.  A number of specific results 
stand out.  First, in the late Soviet period, marriage rates were higher in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan than in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.  These differences may in part reflect 
differences in economic development and levels of urbanisation.  However, they also 
might reflect longer-standing differences in gender and familial systems: traditionally 
female roles have been more restrictive, and women have married at an earlier age, in 
the oasis cultures of the Uzbeks and Tajiks (Jones and Grupp 1987).  Second, in all 
four republics but particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, there is a 
marked increase in the rate of first union formation in the late-Soviet period, with the 
rate peaking in the early 1990s.    
 
[Figure 2 and Table 2 about here] 
 
Third, in all four republics, there has been a sharp decrease in the rate of first 
union formation since this peak in the early post-independence years.  Dommaraju 
and Agadjanian (2008) also noted an incipient decline in marriage rates in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but levels were still above or similar to those in the pre-
perestroika period.  The more recent results presented here show that, such has been 
the decline in first union formation, by the turn of the millennium rates in all four 
republics were significantly lower than in the late 1980s (Table 2).  Thus the marriage 
decline does not simply represent a reversion to a pre-perestroika norm.   16
 
The results also show clear differences between the republics in terms of the 
nature of the decline.  Most notably, Tajikistan, which had the highest rate of first 
union formation pre-independence, had the lowest rate by the early years of the new 
millennium.  This represents a dramatic collapse in the rate of first union formation: 
the rate in 2003 represented a fall of 46% from the late 1980s (Table 2), and of 58% 
from the peak in the early post-independence years.  Uzbekistan, too, experienced a 
particularly sharp decline: the risk of first union formation in 2003 was 34% lower 
than the late-1980s level, and more than 50% lower than the early post-independence 
peak.  In contrast, while there were significant declines in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, these were smaller in comparison: for Kazakhstan (Kyrgyzstan) in 2003, 
the risk of first union formation was 27% (18%) lower than in the late 1980s, and 
around 38% (38%) lower than the peak.   
 
Figure 3 (Model 2, in panel 2)  presents the trends in first union formation 
after controlling for any changes in the age distribution of the population at risk.  
After standardising, the increase in the rate of first union formation in Uzbekistan in 
the early 1990s is even more marked.  Further controlling for changes in ethnic 
composition over time makes little impact on the trends (Figure 3, Model 4).   
Importantly, it is clear that the cross-republic differences in the nature of the temporal 
trend are not simply a reflection of differences in the relative size of ethnic minority 
populations.  On the contrary, considering only the titular populations in each of the 
republics slightly increases the differences between the republics (Figure 3, Model 5).  
Thus by 2003 Tajiks in Tajikistan had experienced a 53% decline in the rate of first 
union formation compared to 1988 (and 64% decline from the early post-  17
independence peak), compared to 37% (59%) in Uzbekistan, 27% (39%) in 
Kazakhstan and 22% (44%) in Kyrgyzstan (Table 3, Model 5). 
 
[Figure 3 and Table 3 about here] 
 
Trends in rate of first union formation for different age groups 
 
In all four republics, the increase in rates of first union formation in the early 1990s 
was most marked at younger ages (Figure 4; Table 4).  From the mid-1990s, in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan decreases in the overall rates of first union formation 
were effected through decreases in the rate for the two youngest groups (15–17 and 
18–20) while rates remained stable in the 21–29 group, and even started to increase in 
Kyrgyzstan.  By the turn of the millennium, rates of first union formation were much 
higher for this older group than for those aged 18–20, indicative of an increase in the 
mean age of first union formation to accompany the decrease in the overall rate.  In 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, rates also fell more sharply amongst the youngest age 
groups from the mid-1990s but, unlike Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the decline in the 
rate at the older ages continued.  In particular, Tajikistan has seen sharp declines in 
this 21–29 age interval since independence, part of a general collapse in the rate of 
first union formation across age groups.  
 
[Figure 4 and Table 4 about here] 
 
In Central Asia, as elsewhere, the extent to which — consistent with the 
‘postponement’ scenario from the cohort perspective — any future increases in the   18
rate of first union formation at older ages compensate for recent declines at younger 
ages is, essentially, an empirical question for future research.  However, the length of 
time in which period rates of first union formation have been at a level significantly 
lower than that of the 1980s would seem to indicate a long-term change in union 
behaviour rather than simply a temporary ‘timing’ effect.  This is most clear in the 
case of Tajikistan, where an acute decrease in rates of first union formation, together 
with the preservation of the age-at-first-union distribution, will translate into a sharp 
increase in the proportion of women who remain never-married — a marked 
departure from the Soviet era, where marriage remained nearly universal, and from 




This study has presented trends in first union formation in post-Soviet Central Asia.  
It extends previous research by, using more recently available survey data, illustrating  
the scale of decline in first unions across the region.  For the first time, it is clear that 
the rate of first union formation is now not only much lower than the early post-
independence peak, but also much lower than the Soviet-era level at the end of the 
1980s.  The paper also extends previous research by including Tajikistan, as well as 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in cross-national comparative analysis.  This 
is a country of particular interest since it experienced the most significant economic 
decline of any post-Soviet republic and yet is, with Uzbekistan, the most socially 
conservative republic in which Islam has the strongest tradition.   
 
Ideational and cultural changes   19
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, changes in family formation associated with the 
second demographic transition — including a decline in marriage rates and increases 
in cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce —  were noted to spread more 
quickly in the most secularised regions (Sobotka 2008).  This study only considered 
one aspect of demographic behaviour, but any declines in the rate of first union 
formation might still be expected to be less marked in republics with a stronger 
religious identity.  On the contrary, post-Soviet Tajikistan and Uzbekistan here 
provide interesting examples of countries experiencing significant declines in first 
union formation (the most significant in the region) at the same time as an increase in 
religiosity, manifested in increased observance of Islamic rituals, a significant 
increase in mosque construction and a ‘desire to connect more fully with the 
traditional practices and culture of the Islamic past’ (Tazmini 2001, p.67).   
 
A few caveats should be addressed.  First, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
have traditionally the strongest Islamic identity in the region, overall within the Soviet 
Union anti-religious policies had managed to curb much official religious activity.  
Nevertheless, Islam never died out, with a deeply rooted ‘folk Islam’ persisting (Atkin 
1989b), such that Atkin’s (1989a, p.28) judgement for Tajikistan is that Islam retained 
a ‘significant following among a broad spectrum of the population’.  Second, while in 
the post-Soviet period there has been a more public display of religion, in part this 
may be because it no longer has to be practiced in secret; thus for Harris (2006, 
p.159), ‘it is unclear that there is a serious religious resurgence’.  Third, religiosity 
does not necessarily equate to ‘conservative’ attitudes towards demographic change.    20
Nevertheless, in this case Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are indeed more socially 
conservative than Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.   
 
Fourth, despite conservative attitudes, more modern attitudes to family 
formation have also emerged.   In the Tajik case, Harris (2006) notes the emergence 
of ‘modernist’ family styles, characterised by a higher degree of individualism and in 
which children have considerable say in the choice of their spouse.  This contrasts to 
the ‘traditionalist’ model, strongly collectivist, in which marriages are arranged by 
family members.  However, as she points out (p.152) the number of modernistic 
families in the republic is very small — at most representing 1% of families in the 
conservative rural areas of Khatlon, and 10% in the capital Dushanbe.  Overall, 
traditionalist values remain important.  The virginity of brides remains important, and 
the movement of unmarried women outside the home tends to be restricted by their 
families (Harris 2004).  Marriage remains highly valued, and the ceremony remains 
the focus of conspicuous demonstrations of wealth.  Mensch et al (2005) report a 
theory that delays in marriage, which would be manifested in a decrease in period 
rates of marriage, may in some parts of Asia reflect changes in the marriage process 
and a shift away from arranged marriages — generally considered less time 
consuming — towards children choosing their own spouse.  Given that arranged 
marriage remains the norm in Tajikistan, this is not the case here. 
 
Traditionalist values are reflected in attitudes to gender roles.  Increasingly in 
the post-Soviet period, in the absence of alternative accommodation, newly married 
women become kelin, ‘incomers’, in the home of their husband’s family.  As well as 
childbearing, heavy emphasis is placed on their domestic role in the household, to   21
such an extent that uneducated girls, less likely to pursue a job, are often preferred by 
their prospective mothers-in-law (Harris 2006).  Indeed, as Falkingham (2000) argues, 
there has been a significant gender dimension to the nature of post-independence 
changes in Tajikistan, with women concentrated in the lowest-paid sectors, including 
agriculture, education and health, where wages are insufficient to live on.  The 
gendered nature of change is also reflected in the decrease in female enrolment in 
upper secondary and tertiary education.  
 
The situation is different in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where there have 
been significant increases in enrolment in tertiary education (Figure 5), in which 
females outnumber males.  Declines in first union formation in the two republics over 
this period have been concentrated at younger ages, which is at least consistent with 
the influence of increased female participation in higher education, while the rate at 
older ages has remained stable (Figure 4 and Table 4).  Enrolment in education has 
been cited as a major factor behind the delay of marriages in other contexts (for 
example, Malhotra and Tsui 1996) and it is possible that it explains part of the recent 
decline in first union formation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  Overall, however, 
cultural and ideational changes — which would have pointed towards a less, rather 
than more, significant decrease in union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan than 
elsewhere — do not on their own provide sufficient explanation for the trends in first 
union formation in post-Soviet Central Asia.   
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Economic change associated with the development of a market economy   22
 
The longer-term economic changes associated with the transition to a market 
economy are likely to have played an important role in the decline in first union 
formation across the region.   The Soviet system had, in many ways, represented an 
artificial ‘greenhouse’ environment, in which state population policy was important in 
shaping family decisions and, even amongst the urban population, reproduction was 
not impacted by career choices (Sobotka 2002).  In particular,  as Harris (2002, p.218) 
summarises, ‘benefits paid to mothers of large families, cheap housing, free education 
and health care, free plots of land for members of communal and state farms, and the 
low costs of essential food stuffs’ all made it possible for most families to afford the 
economic costs of family life without too much hardship.  The absence of such state 
support, together with reduced job security in the market environment, helped to 
undermine the pattern of universal and early family formation — hence contributing 
to the decrease in the rate of first union formation.  Economic concerns are given 
extra significance given the significant costs associated with the wedding ceremony 
and the associated gift exchanges.  Olimova and Bosc (2003, p.111) report that young 
people in Tajikistan are ‘forced to postpone marriage until they have enough money 
for a wedding’. 
 
There is evidence that some of the increased burden associated with the 
withdrawal of family benefits in Central Asia, particularly in the area of childcare, has 
been taken on by the extended family (Pascall and Manning 2000).  Further, the 
patrilocal tradition might be expected to reduce the extent to which difficulty in 
finding housing discourages first union formation.  Indeed, more generally it has been 
argued that economic pressure for a decline in union formation is reduced in a context   23
in which the extended, rather than nuclear, family is the norm (Dixon 1971).  But the 
declines in rates of first union formation shown here, and particularly in Tajikistan, 
show that such were the changes in material circumstances that they necessitated 
changes in family formation behaviour even with the availability of family support. 
 
The economic changes associated with the transition to a market economy 
prompted new and significant movements of labour migrants from Central Asia, 
largely to Russia, in the post-Soviet period.  The effect has been to remove eligible 
bachelors from the marriage market, a further negative influence on trends in union 
formation.  Thus Harris (1998, p.661) reports, of the Gharmi villages in Khatlon, 
Tajikistan that ‘the absence of young men of marriageable age has made it extremely 
difficult to find spouses for the girls and there are increasing numbers of unmarried 
girls as old as 22 or 23 [which was previously unheard of]’. Given the scale of 
remittances to Tajikistan in 2008 (Ratha et al. 2008), it is likely that Tajikistan has 
been most severely affected by labour migration.  However, recorded remittance 
flows from Tajikistan have only increased significantly in the last few years.  Given 
the lack of reliable data, there is no clear quantitative evidence that migration flows at 
the turn of the millennium were more significant, for example, from Tajikistan than 
Kyrgyzstan, despite the clear differences in the relative decline in first union 
formation by this time. 
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Periods of economic crisis and food scarcity 
 
After the peak in the early post-independence years, rates of first union formation 
started to decline across the region.  This may in large part reflect a rational response 
to a change in material circumstances (Caldwell 2004) associated with the period of 
dramatic post-Soviet economic crisis.  Indeed, the later decline in first union 
formation in Uzbekistan — in comparison to the other republics — apparent after 
controlling for changes in the age distribution of unmarried women (Figure 3, Model 
2), and particularly apparent when comparing declines amongst the titular populations 
only (Figure 3, Model 4), is consistent with this explanation.  The Uzbek government, 
compared to other republics in the region, pursued a more gradual market reform 
strategy.  In the first few years of independence, it experienced the smallest decline in 
GDP of any former Soviet republic, such that initially its population experienced a 
less dramatic change in material circumstances than in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan (Pomfret and Anderson 1997; Pomfret 2000).  In this context, it is 
perhaps not surprising that first union formation started to decline at least one year 
later than in the other republics. 
 
But while rates of first union formation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan started 
to stabilise by the end of the 1990s, rates in Uzbekistan — paralleling those in 
Tajikistan — continued to decline.  In this context it is significant that, of the 
countries in transition, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have seen the most serious declines 
in food security (FAO 2006) — reflected in periods of particular food crisis — in the 
post-Soviet period.  Clifford et al. (2008) describe the food crisis in Tajikistan in 
1995, where the scarcity of flour and bread and simultaneous price liberalisation, such   25
that open market bread increased sixfold in the first six months of the year (Grand et 
al. 2001), had an acute impact on the welfare of the population.  As Harris (2004, 
p.29) describes, ‘many people suffered significant hunger over a period of many 
months’ and it was only aid from international agencies that prevented famine. 
Uzbekistan faced similar pressures: just as in Tajikistan, the population had become 
even more reliant on bread during the early years of independence — and just as in 
Tajikistan, in 1995 the population were faced with a ‘perfect storm’ of decreases in 
overall grain availability, as imports declined (to less than half of 1994 levels in 
Uzbekistan: FAO 2008b), accompanied by the liberalisation of bread prices 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1994, p.70). 
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan became increasingly 
reliant on locally produced grain as imports remained well below Soviet levels 
(Figure 6).  In 2000 and 2001, both countries were affected by a severe drought, 
estimated to be the worst for 70 years (IRI 2001), which did not affect Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan.  This led to an almost total failure of the rainfed wheat crop and 
significant drops in the irrigated wheat yield (FAO/WFP 2000).  These declines had a 
serious effect on food security.  As many as one million people in Tajikistan faced 
malnutrition and potential starvation (Economist Intelligence Unit 2001) and were 
dependent on international aid.  About 40% of Uzbekistan’s population lived in the 
affected areas (WHO 2000).  The situation was particularly acute in the second year 
of drought in 2001, reflecting the cumulative effect of persistent water and food 
shortage, as people had exhausted whatever coping strategies remained.   
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Given past studies of the relationship between periods of food scarcity and 
nuptiality (Lee 1981; Galloway 1988), we would expect a decline in the rate of union 
formation during these periods of food crisis.    Indeed, the remarkable consistency in 
the annual (non-smoothed) fluctuations in rates of first union formation (Figure 7, 
showing Model 5 results for the titular ethnic group only) help to not only illustrate 
the parallels between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan but also the particularly sharp 
declines in union formation in both countries in 1995 and 2001.  In 1995, the rate of 
first union formation decreased by 33% in Tajikistan (p=0.005) and by 27% in 
Uzbekistan (p=0.001) (Table 5).   While there is no evidence for a change in the rate 
of first union formation during the first year of drought, the rate during the second 
year of the drought was just 76% (p=0.062) of pre-drought (1999) levels in Tajikistan, 
and 75% (p=0.003) of pre-drought levels in Uzbekistan (Figure 7; Table 5).   Overall, 
rates of union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan declined dramatically during 
these periods of crisis and failed to recover in subsequent years.   
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
[Figure 7 and Table 5 about here] 
 
Therefore, while longer-term economic changes were also important 
influences on the decline in first union formation across the region, periods of food 
crisis may help to explain why the declines in first union formation were particularly 
significant in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Key to the sustained impact of these periods 
of crisis on union formation may have been their role in prompting labour migration.  
In the Tajik case, Harris (1998, p.661) points to the mid-1990s, the time of the food   27
crisis, as a time in which men in the Gharmi villages of Khatlon decided to become 
migrant workers in other parts of the Soviet Union, and Olimova and Bosc (2003 p.8, 
21) also point to 1995 as a time when labour migration ‘increased dramatically’, for 
many offering the ‘only alternative to going hungry’.  Similarly, reports at the time 
suggest that the drought in Tajikistan in 2000–01 prompted many men to leave the 
country to find work (OCHA 2000; World Food Programme 2001).  These 
movements may have a lasting impact on union formation even as the food crisis 
eases.  This is because migrants may stay abroad for several years, with some not 
returning at all (Mughal 2007), and because migration flows may gain momentum as 
networks develop and individuals follow others within their community in leaving to 
work abroad.  Thus if differences between republics in the relative importance of 
labour migration do exist, with Uzbekistan and especially Tajikistan most acutely 
affected, then periods of food crisis may be an important factor in helping to explain 
the differing intensity of migration flows.  In turn, this may help to explain cross-
country differences in the extent of decline in first union formation.  Further research 
developing or challenging these ideas would be welcome. 
 
Evaluating the demographic impact of conflict in Tajikistan 
 
Comparing the trends in first union formation in Tajikistan, which experienced a civil 
war, with those in Uzbekistan, a neighbouring country sharing similar demographic 
characteristics but which didn’t experience war, offers an interesting opportunity to 
contribute to the literature on the demographic effects of conflict.  Figures for the 
number of casualties in the Tajik civil war, between supporters of the Communist 
party government and a coalition of groups in ‘opposition’, are very hard to establish;   28
the International Crisis Group (2001) estimate that 60,000 to 100,000 people were 
killed between 1992 and 1997, from a total population of 5.1 million (at the time of 
the 1989 census).  The most severe fighting, and therefore the majority of deaths, was 
concentrated in the last six months of 1992.   
  
One interpretation of the earlier decline in first union formation in Tajikistan 
compared to Uzbekistan, and indeed the subsequent sustained difference in the rates 
between the different countries  (Figure 7 and Table 5), is that this reflects the effect 
of war-related mortality on the availability of eligible males.  Indeed, Shemyakina 
(2007) shows that unmarried women of marriageable age in conflict-affected areas in 
Tajikistan were significantly less likely to marry than those from lesser affected 
regions.  However, over and above the effect on local marriage markets, the effect on 
aggregate trends in first union formation is less clear.  Indeed, trends in union 
formation in Tajikistan at this time are similar to those in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
(Figure 3; Models 2, 4 and 5); in fact, as discussed earlier, in the early post-
independence years it is not Tajikistan but Uzbekistan — possibly because of its more 
gradual reform in the early independence years — which stands out.  Further, it is 
unclear that war-related mortality in 1992, presumably disproportionately affecting 
males who were already adults, would continue to explain the significantly lower rate 
of first union formation in Tajikistan  more than 10 years later.  Overall, the absence 
of reliable and detailed mortality information precludes more definite conclusions.  
Nevertheless, the very close correspondence between the annual patterns of first union 
formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — and the scale of decline in Uzbekistan in 
the absence of any conflict — shows that the civil war is by no means the main reason 
for the decline in union formation in Tajikistan.  On the contrary, both longer-term   29
economic factors, and periods of economic crisis and food scarcity, are likely to have 
been far more important.  Even the lower rate of union formation in Tajikistan 
compared to Uzbekistan probably more reflects the especially acute nature of the 




As in post-communist Europe (Frejka 2008), the underlying root cause of the changes 
in first union formation in Central Asia has been the shift from state socialist regimes 
to market economies.  This perspective provides a framework for considering 
economic influences on union formation which cannot be simply reduced to ‘crisis’ 
explanations.  Even the periods of food crisis are symptomatic of a longer-term 
change from reliance on centrally-planned food imports to increased self-sufficiency, 
and from subsidised to free-market pricing, which has effected a one-off transition to 
a context in which minimum consumption levels are no longer guaranteed.    Further, 
the increasing dependence on income from international labour migration is a form of 
economic change which, given the absence of males for extended periods, may have a 
long-lasting influence on patterns of first union formation.  Indeed, it will be 
interesting to note the extent to which traditional expectations for demographic 
behaviour, specifically early and universal marriage, change as a result of the 
significant declines in first union formation.  Given the close link between 
demographic behaviour and attitudes, any changes in norms may serve to reinforce 
behaviour such that rates of first union formation remain low, relative to the Soviet 
period, even as the changes which prompted the decline become less influential. 
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Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
This paper, for the first time, shows that there were significant declines in the rate of 
first union formation in post-Soviet Central Asia.  In so doing, it serves to 
complement existing work on post-communist trends in first union formation — 
which has tended to focus on Central and Eastern Europe (for example, Sobotka 2004; 
Sobotka and Toulemon 2008) by illustrating the scale of post-Soviet demographic 
change in a very different cultural and demographic context, in which fertility levels 
were much higher at the time of independence.  More widely, given that the most 
significant declines of all were in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it has shown the 
potential for rates of first union formation to decline rapidly in a conservative Moslem 
setting.  Perhaps most importantly, it contributes to our understanding of human 
behaviour during a period of dramatic social and economic change. 
 
Future work is required not only to develop the themes discussed here, and to 
explore other demographic changes in this under-researched region, but also to 
consider the social consequences of demographic change.  For example, the post-
Soviet transition has had the effect of ‘familializing women, intensifying their need 
for family connections to survive the loss of social support’ (Pascall and Manning 
2000, p.257)  — yet, as this paper shows, there has been a simultaneous and 
significant decrease in the rate of first union formation, such that a much greater 
proportion of young women than before are not in a union.  There are potential 
implications for the welfare of women which should be explored. 
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Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
 
Figure 1 Trends in real GDP in Central Asia (index, 1989=100) 
Source: TransMONEE (2006) 
 
 
Table 1 Prevalence of undernourishment
1 in the total population of four Central Asian republics 
(%) 
 1993-1995  2001-03 
Kazakhstan 3  8 
Kyrgyzstan 21  4 
Tajikistan 22  61 
Uzbekistan 8  26 
1 FAO’s estimates of the prevalence of undernourishment are ‘essentially a measure of food deprivation based on 
the calculation of three key parameters for each country: the average amount of food available for human 
consumption per person, the level of inequality in access to that food and the minimum number of calories required 
for an average person’.  See http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx (Goal 1, Target 1.C) for further details.  
These are the only years for which estimates are available.   













Tajikistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan
Figure 2 Rate of first union formation
1 in Central Asia (three-year moving average) 
1 Rates per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years inclusive. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS3 surveys.  Results of Model 1. 
 
 
Table 2 Relative risks
1 of union formation in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate
2 
  Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
1987  1.03  1.01   
1988  (131)   -  (132)   -  (163)   -  (150)   - 
1989 1.04 1.13  1.13  1.09 
1990 1.13 1.24  1.20  1.13 
1991 1.18 1.33  1.29  1.25 
1992 1.10 1.32  1.29  1.27 
1993 1.06 1.16  1.28  1.35 
1994 1.00 1.06  1.11  1.24 
1995 0.96 0.97  0.92  1.10 
1996 0.85 0.90  0.84  0.97 
1997 0.81 0.84  0.83  0.92 
1998 0.76 0.79  0.77  0.87 
1999 0.77 0.91  0.70  0.82 
2000 0.77 0.93  0.60  0.75 
2001 0.77 0.90  0.56  0.70 
2002 0.75 0.81  0.51  0.65 
2003 0.73 0.82  0.54  0.66 
2004 0.71      0.69 
Nu  6,473 3,429  4,506  6,691 
Nwy 56,953  25,727  38,098  50,617 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation. 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women aged 15-29 years inclusive. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period for sampled women. 













1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004











1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004











1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004











1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
(1) Year 
(2) Year, age 
(4) Year, age, ethnicity 
(5) Year, age; titular ethnic 
group only 
Figure 3 Trends in union formation in Central Asia: relative risks
1, compared to 1988 rate.  Results for Models (1), (2), (4) and (5) —  covariates in bold. 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation. 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS3 surveys.  Results of Models 1, 2, 4 and 5.   39
  (1) Year 
 Kazakhstan K yrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
1987 1.03  1.01
1 9 8 8  11   11
1989 1.04 1.13  1.13 1.09
1990 1.13 1.24  1.20 1.13
1991 1.18 1.33  1.29 1.25
1992 1.10 1.32  1.29 1.27
1993 1.06 1.16  1.28 1.35
1994 1.00 1.06  1.11 1.24
1995 0.96 0.97  0.92 1.10
1996 0.85 0.90  0.84 0.97
1997 0.81 0.84  0.83 0.92
1998 0.76 0.79  0.77 0.87
1999 0.77 0.91  0.70 0.82
2000 0.77 0.93  0.60 0.75
2001 0.77 0.90  0.56 0.70
2002 0.75 0.81  0.51 0.65
2003 0.73 0.82  0.54 0.66
2004 0.71   0.69
  (2) Year, age
 Kazakhstan K yrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
1987 1.03  1.02
1988 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00
1989 1.04 1.15  1.12 1.10
1990 1.15 1.27  1.20 1.16
1991 1.23 1.38  1.32 1.31
1992 1.15 1.37  1.34 1.35
1993 1.11 1.23  1.34 1.46
1994 1.03 1.12  1.15 1.38
1995 1.00 1.03  0.95 1.26
1996 0.89 0.96  0.87 1.12
1997 0.84 0.88  0.86 1.05
1998 0.79 0.82  0.80 0.97
1999 0.80 0.93  0.71 0.89
2000 0.79 0.95  0.60 0.80
2001 0.79 0.93  0.55 0.73
2002 0.76 0.84  0.49 0.66
2003 0.75 0.84  0.50 0.65
2004 0.74   0.64
 
 
  (4) Year, age, ethnicity  
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
1987 1.03 1.02  
1988 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1989 1.04 1.15 1.12 1.10 
1990 1.15 1.27 1.20 1.16 
1991 1.22 1.38 1.32 1.30 
1992 1.15 1.38 1.34 1.34 
1993 1.11 1.23 1.34 1.46 
1994 1.03 1.12 1.15 1.38 
1995 0.99 1.03 0.96 1.26 
1996 0.88 0.96 0.88 1.11 
1997 0.84 0.89 0.87 1.05 
1998 0.79 0.82 0.80 0.97 
1999 0.80 0.93 0.72 0.89 
2000 0.79 0.95 0.60 0.79 
2001 0.79 0.93 0.55 0.72 
2002 0.76 0.84 0.48 0.65 
2003 0.74 0.84 0.50 0.64 
2004 0.73 0.64 
  (5) Year, age; titular ethnic group only 
  Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
1987 0.97 1.04  
1988 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1989 1.03 1.04 1.12 1.10 
1990 1.13 1.24 1.18 1.18 
1991 1.20 1.35 1.31 1.33 
1992 1.10 1.40 1.30 1.39 
1993 1.05 1.22 1.30 1.53 
1994 0.95 1.08 1.09 1.45 
1995 0.92 0.95 0.92 1.30 
1996 0.80 0.84 0.83 1.13 
1997 0.79 0.73 0.81 1.05 
1998 0.74 0.70 0.72 0.97 
1999 0.76 0.84 0.65 0.90 
2000 0.74 0.90 0.57 0.80 
2001 0.75 0.88 0.52 0.72 
2002 0.74 0.77 0.46 0.64 
2003 0.73 0.78 0.47 0.63 
2004 0.74 0.63 
Table 3 Relative risks
1of union formation in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate.  Results for Models (1), (2), (4) and (5) — covariates in bold. 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation. 
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Figure 4 Rate of union formation for different age groups in Central Asia (three-year moving average) 
1 Rate (y-axis) per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women in age group.  Source: author’s analysis of MICS3 surveys.  Results of Model 3. 
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Table 4 Relative risks
1 of union formation for different age groups in Central Asia, compared to 1988 rate
2 
 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
    15-17 18-20 21-29    15-17 18-20 21-29   15-17  18-20  21-29  15-17  18-20  21-29 
1987            1.10 1.00 1.06    0.98 1.06 0.97         
1988    (26) -  (162) -  (232) -    (32) -  (202) -  (236) -    (40) -  (308) -  (309) -    (34) -  (232) -  (317) - 
1989  1.10  1.07  1.01  1.28  1.05  1.23  1.42  1.10  1.02  1.04  1.12  1.10 
1990  1.54  1.20  1.05  1.66  1.13  1.32  1.63  1.16  1.09  1.37  1.19  1.06 
1991  1.82  1.26  1.11  2.19  1.37  1.16  1.92  1.30  1.11  1.73  1.41  1.03 
1992  1.82  1.19  1.02  2.39  1.37  1.08  2.00  1.30  1.12  2.04  1.49  0.94 
1993  1.81  1.21  0.93  2.06  1.33  0.87  2.35  1.29  0.97  2.21  1.66  0.94 
1994  1.90  1.16  0.80  1.72  1.10  0.97  2.36  1.06  0.75  2.03  1.57  0.91 
1995  1.92  1.11  0.77  1.38  1.11  0.86  1.93  0.89  0.62  1.63  1.42  0.91 
1996  1.77  0.90  0.74  1.13  1.04  0.81  1.55  0.82  0.65  1.26  1.24  0.89 
1997  1.48  0.87  0.72  1.05  0.99  0.72  1.46  0.82  0.67  1.17  1.12  0.91 
1998  1.19  0.84  0.70  1.01  0.87  0.72  1.52  0.72  0.62  1.13  1.02  0.84 
1999  1.06  0.85  0.74  1.22  0.91  0.88  1.34  0.63  0.59  1.03  0.88  0.88 
2000  0.92  0.81  0.77  1.22  0.92  0.92  1.01  0.53  0.54  0.77  0.80  0.83 
2001  0.83  0.81  0.77  1.16  0.83  1.00  0.78  0.51  0.51  0.58  0.71  0.82 
2002  0.78  0.78  0.75  0.77  0.76  0.96  0.65  0.45  0.47  0.42  0.64  0.76 
2003  0.82  0.73  0.75  0.63  0.72  1.05  0.67  0.46  0.49  0.38  0.61  0.77 
2004    0.78  0.69  0.76                0.33  0.55  0.75 
Nu    704 2,493  3,276    533 1,582  1,314    834 2,266  1,406    909 3,363  2,419 
Nwy    22,961 16,981 17,012  12,519  7,755  5,453   19,052 11,325  7,720   25,381 15,910  9,326 
 
1 Relative risks based on the 3-year moving average of the rate of first union formation for a given age group. 
2 1988 rate shown in brackets in bold; per 1,000 years of exposure for unmarried women in age group. 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period in age group for sampled women. 



































Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
 
Figure 5 Higher education enrolment
1 in four Central Asian republics, 1989-2003 
1 As percentage of population aged 19-24 years. 
Source: As for Figure 1. 


































Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan
 
Figure 6 Quantity of cereal imports in four Central Asian republics, 1992-1999 
Note: The populations for the different republics, according to the 1989 Soviet census, were: Uzbekistan – 19.9m; 
Tajikistan – 5.1m; Kyrgyzstan – 4.3m; Kazakhstan – 16.7m. 










1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Tajikistan Uzbekistan
 
Figure 7 Trends in union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: relative risks
1, 
compared to 1988 rate (controlling for age; titular ethnic group only). 
1 Relative risk based on the annual rate of union formation (no smoothing). 
Source: author’s analysis of MICS3 surveys.  Results of Model 5. 
 
Table 5 Relative risks
1 of union formation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, compared to 
1988 rate 
(controlling for age; titular ethnic group only). 
 Tajikistan Uzbekistan
1986 1.19  
1987 1.05 1.08 
1988 1.00 1.00 
1989 1.05 0.98 
1990 1.43 1.39 
1991 1.19 1.23 
1992 1.43 1.46 
1993 1.41 1.57 
1994 1.18 1.65 
1995 0.79 1.21 
1996 0.87 1.12 
1997 0.90 1.12 
1998 0.73 0.97 
1999 0.62 0.88 
2000 0.66 0.90 
2001 0.47 0.66 
2002 0.49 0.66 
2003 0.47 0.65 
2004 0.49 0.61 
2005  0.66 
Nu  4,506 6,691 
Nwy 38,098  50,617 
1 Relative risks based on the annual rate of first union formation (no smoothing). 
Nu and Nwy: number of unions, and number of years of exposure, in total analysis period for sampled 
women. 
Source: As for Figure 7. 